# **Transparent Certificate Revocation for CBE Based on Blockchain**

#### Introduction

Certificate-based encryption (CBE) [1] achieves the certificate revocation through centralized CA. However, CA's malicious revocation may indirectly make user's decryption fail.

#### Problem

- CA: arbitrary revocation.
- CA: revocation repudiation.
- CA: lack of incentives.



#### Solution

The smart contract is involved as an agent to prevent the CA from maliciously revoking certificates.



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#### Protocol

A generic CBE construction includes five algorithms: Key Generate, Set Key, Certificate<sup>\*</sup>, Encrypt, Decrypt, in which we emphasize the enhancement of the Certificate\* protocol.



**Blockchain-based CBE Model** 

• (1) Request. The user sends the revocation requests to a smart contract (SC). • (2) Manage. The SC (1) stores the revocation conditions. (2) sets the incentive policies. (3) verifies the eligibility of revocations.



- (3) Inform. The SC informs CA by sending the approval to CA.
- (4) Update. The CA updates certificates revocation information through a binary tree (the difference sub-cover approach [2]).
- (5) Release. After a successful revocation, the leaves in the subset will be pushed back to users for further decryption.

Generate Valid Records



#### Properties

- [Transparency]. Revocation data and conditions are transparent.
- [Accountability]. Revocation requests are globally auditable.
- [Non-repudiation]. CA cannot deny her illegal revocations.
- [Automation]. Revocation operations are automatically executed.

### Future work

- The scalability issue inherited from the blockchain.
- The privacy issue in the revocation.

### References

Springer, 2003.



- [Deterrence]. CA with the illegal
- revocations will be punished.

- [1] Gentry, Craig. "Certificate-based encryption and the certificate revocation problem." In Crypto. pages 272-293,
- [2] Naor, Dalit, Moni Naor, and Jeff Lotspiech. "Revocation and tracing schemes for stateless receivers." In Crypto. pages 41-62, Springer, 2001.





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